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Summary Anger and fear are frequently felt and impactful workplace emotions, espe­
cially in times of crisis when critical decisions need to be made. An important question is 
how these emotions might inﬂuence decision makers' depth of processing: whether when 
feeling angry or fearful decision-makers engage in more conscious and analytical rational 
decision making, or less-conscious and heuristic intuitive decision making. To date research 
on the effect of these strong emotions has been limited to laboratory studies where the 
complexity and pressures of real-world managerial decisions are absent, and focused on 
generalized mood rather than on direct emotional experience. This study asks two research 
questions: Do anger and fear facilitate the use of intuitive or rational decision-making? And 
what is the impact of these emotions on decision effectiveness? We examine these phenom­
ena in the crisis-laden ﬁeld setting of ﬁlm directors actively engaged in directing motion 
pictures. Data were gathered by shadowing and interviewing seven ﬁlm directors. A qual­
itative analysis of the video and audio transcripts revealed that ﬁlm directors engage in 
two types of intuitive decision-making, based on whether the decision was driven by exper­
tise or personal emotional experience. Rational decision-making occurred when directors, 
driven by feelings of moderate fear and little previous experience with a situation, relied on 
a more conscious, deliberative decision-making process. Four types of decision effective­
ness are identiﬁed: task, personal, growth, and leadership. The implications of emotion-
driven decision-making on each of these types of effectiveness are explored. 
Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Introduction 
Long gone is the time when researchers assumed that emo­
tions played no role in decision-making (e.g., Von Neuman & 
Morgenstern, 1944). Since Simon (1955,1968) ﬁrst critiqued 
the rational decision-making paradigm, numerous studies 
have shown the importance of emotions in decision-making 
(for reviews, see Damasio, 1998; Forgas, 1995; Loewenstein 
& Lerner, 2003). Neurobiological studies, for instance, have 
shown that it is impossible for people to make simple 
decisions when regions of the brain associated with emotion 
have been damaged (Damasio, 1998; Lieberman, 2000). 
One particular question that decision-making researchers 
have examined is how affect inﬂuences depth of processing; 
that is, whether people engage in systematic processing 
(rational decision-making) or heuristic processing (intuitive 
decision-making). By and large, studies on this topic have 
shown that when people are in a good mood they are more 
likely to engage in intuitive decision-making (Bolte, 
Goschke, & Kuhl, 2003; Isen, 2000; Weiss & Cropanzano, 
1996), whereas when they are in a bad mood they are more 
likely to engage in rational decision-making (Elsbach & Barr, 
1999; Staw & Barsade, 1993). 
While these results are important, they do not specify 
how speciﬁc emotions inﬂuence the type of decision pro­
cessing (rational or intuitive) in which an individual engages. 
This question is critical because other studies of emotion 
and decision-making have shown that emotions of the same 
valence (e.g., anger and sadness) can have quite different 
effects on decision-making (e.g., Keltner, Ellsworth, & 
Edwards, 1993), calling for the need for studies that go 
beyond mere valence effects when studying how affect 
inﬂuences decision-making (Lerner & Keltner, 2000). 
To answer this call, this study explores the relationship 
between two discrete negative emotions, anger and fear, 
on decision-making. More speciﬁcally, we explore two ques­
tions. (1) Do the emotions of anger and fear facilitate the 
use of intuitive or rational decision-making? And, (2) What 
is the impact of anger and fear on decision-making effec­
tiveness? We investigate these questions in the crisis-laden 
ﬁeld setting of movie directors making decisions on set. 
We focus on the emotions of anger and fear for several 
reasons. First, anger and fear are ubiquitous in both every­
day life and work settings, and thought to affect decision-
making (Averill, 1982; Kish-Gephart, Detert, Trevin˜o, & 
Edmondson, 2009; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Pekrun & Friese, 
1992). Second, studies of ‘‘basic’’ emotions have shown 
that they are among the most easily identiﬁable emotions 
in people's faces, gestures, and language (Ekman, 1994; 
Scherer, 1986). Finally, anger and fear naturally emerged 
as the most commonly occurring emotions in our setting. 
While we originally set out to study a variety of emotions 
in relation to decision-making, analysis of our data revealed 
that anger and fear occurred in 71% of all of our cases. We 
therefore decided to restrict our study to these two 
emotions. 
We chose to investigate our question in a ﬁeld setting 
ﬁrst because the majority of studies on the role of affect 
in decision-making have been laboratory experiments, 
where time pressure and stakes are low, personal invest­
ment in decisions is imaginary, and the decision-making pro­
cesses and outcomes studied are simple. This contrasts with 
the more complex real-world decision-making processes in 
which managers actually engage (Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu, 
& Salas, 2001), where affect may be found to have a differ­
ent effect on decision-making than in the laboratory. For in­
stance, the majority of laboratory experiments have found 
that when in a good mood subjects tend to perform better 
on creative tasks (Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987; Isen, 
Johnson, Mertz, & Robinson, 1985) associated with intuitive 
processing (Agor, 1991; Lubart & Getz, 1997). However, in 
their ﬁeld study of an organizational unit charged with 
developing creative designs, George and Zhou (2002) found 
that negative, rather than positive, mood facilitated 
on-the-job creativity in the unit they studied. In addition 
to these mixed results, researchers studying the decision-
making of experts have expressed doubt that laboratory 
results can be generalized to contexts characterized by 
‘‘ill-structured problems, uncertain, dynamic environ­
ments, shifting, ill-deﬁned, or competing goals, multiple 
event-feedback loops, time constraints, [and] high stakes’’ 
(Lipshitz et al., 2001: 334). 
A second reason motivating us to investigate our ques­
tions in a ﬁeld setting is that most existing studies on affect 
and decision-making have examined the inﬂuence of inciden­
tal rather than direct emotions on cognition. This research 
typically examines the effects of moods or emotions gener­
ated in one setting on cognitive processes in another setting. 
In intuition studies, for example, participants are induced to 
feel positive or negative affect and then given a task in which 
their depth of processing can be inferred (Tiedens & Linton, 
2001). However, measuring the inﬂuence of incidental emo­
tion (emotion not related to the cognitive processing task 
that is presented) is not the same as measuring the effects 
of direct emotion (emotion that is relevant to participants, 
the situation they face, and the target of their expressed 
emotion). This is particularly important in situations likely 
to foster intuitive thinking, since theory suggests that intui­
tive processes involve affectively-charged situations and 
emotional neural pathways (Dane & Pratt, 2007). We thus 
investigate our topic in a naturalistic rather than a laboratory 
setting. We examine the inﬂuence on decision making of 
emotions speciﬁcally generated by the situation of directing 
actors on a movie set. While the effects of anger and sadness 
on decision-making have been compared in laboratory 
studies, to our knowledge, no studies have compared and 
contrasted the effects of anger and fear on depth of process­
ing, particularly in a ﬁeld setting. We place our study within a 
growing tradition of qualitative studies of decision making in 
ﬁeld settings, such as Hensman and Sadler-Smith (2011), 
Lipshitz and Shulimovitz (2007), Woiceshyn (2009), and 
Sadler-Smith and Shefy (2004). 
Theoretical background 
Deﬁnitions 
Dual-processing theory: rational and intuitive decision-
making 
A number of psychologists have come to accept the notion 
of ‘‘dual-processing’’ in decision making (Adolphs, Tranel, 
& Damasio, 2003; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Damasio, 
1998; Epstein, 1998; Kahneman, 2003; Kihlstrom, 1987; 
Loewenstein, 1996). Dual-processing is the idea that people 
process information with two distinct systems: a primary 
information processing system associated with intuition, 
and a secondary information processing system associated 
with reasoning (see summary in Salas, Rosen, & DiazGrana­
dos, 2010). 
The primary system has been characterized as fast, 
occurring outside of awareness, relying upon associations, 
holistic and synthetic, affect-laden, vivid, value-based, 
relying upon narratives, symbols, images and metaphors, 
based on experiential and tacit knowledge, relatively less 
intentional and effortful, and slow-learning (Agor, 1991; 
Burke & Miller, 1999; Dane & Pratt, 2007; Khatri & Ng, 2000; 
Sadler-Smith & Shefy, 2004; Sayegh, Anthony, & Perrewe´, 
2004). Dane and Pratt (2007: 40), for example, deﬁne intu­
itions as ‘‘affectively charged judgments that arise through 
rapid, nonconscious, and holistic associations.’’ In contrast, 
the secondary system is slow, conscious, relies on causal 
connections, is fragmented, affectively- and value -neutral, 
relies upon concepts and rules, is based on abstract and ex­
plicit knowledge, is relatively more intentional and effort­
ful, and is fast-learning (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Epstein, 
1998; Kahneman, 2003). Table 1 summarizes the differences 
between intuitive and rational decision-making (or primary 
and secondary processing). 
Research on the primary system has evidenced its con­
nection with experience. As people repeatedly face the 
same stimuli or problems, they develop automatic ways of 
processing information about them and addressing them 
(Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). This automation relieves the 
mind from having to process all information consciously, 
which would be prohibitively costly in cognitive terms 
(Kahneman, 2003). In certain cases, a single vivid exposure 
to a given stimuli might leave a strong imprint in memory, 
and constitute an experience that can inﬂuence intuitive 
processing (Brown & Kulik, 1977). 
While experience is typically unreﬂective or casual, 
expertise refers to a reﬂective and well-rehearsed type of 
experience developed by experts such as chess-masters, 
virtuoso musicians, athletes, or gifted mathematicians 
(Ericsson & Charness, 1994). Research on experts has clearly 
established the link between repeated exposure to speciﬁc 
types of problem through practice and training (expertise) 
and the ability to excel in a domain of activity through 
effective intuitive decision-making (Dane & Pratt, 2007; 
Ericsson & Charness, 1994). 
Emotion 
Emotions are affective states that include physiological 
reactions and action sequences triggered by stimuli having 
meaning for individuals (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus & Folkman, 
1984). Emotions can be described in terms of their inten­
sity—high or low—and their valence—pleasant or unpleasant— 
and are generally of short duration (Feldman, 1995; Russell, 
1999). While researchers initially studying decision-making 
assumed that cognitive processes always preceded emo­
tional responses, it is now clear that emotions permeate 
individuals' perceptual processes and that affective judg­
ments and reactions may precede cognition (LeDoux, 
Table 1 Key differences between IDM and RDM. 
1996; Zajonc, 1980). Emotion as a construct is distinct from 
mood and affect. Moods are more diffuse, less intense, last 
longer than emotions, and have no clear cause (Ekman, 
1994). In contrast to mood, emotions are sometimes labeled 
‘‘discrete’’ because they are focused on a speciﬁc target or 
cause, such as the desire to approach objects in anger or to 
avoid them in fear (see Barsade & Gibson, 2007; LeDoux, 
1996). Affect is the generic term used to refer to both emo­
tion and mood. 
We distinguish intuitive decision-making from emotions 
by noting that the former is a non-conscious information 
processing system aimed at making judgments (Dane & 
Pratt, 2007), while the latter are inputs to this process. 
Sadler-Smith further notes that ‘‘intuitions are feeling 
states that can be pinned down to a particular person, ob­
ject, or situation, [but] the reason for the intuition [. . .] is  
less easily pinpointed’’ (2010: 226), while emotions are 
more intense, of shorter duration, and the reason for the 
feeling is readily apparent. 
Do anger and fear facilitate the use of intuitive or 
rational decision-making? 
Our ﬁrst research question has implications for studies that 
have found that positive mood facilitates the use of intui­
tive decision-making, while negative mood impedes its use 
in favor of rational decision-making (Forgas, 1998; Isen, 
2000). For instance, individuals induced with a positive 
mood found more unusual associations between words (Isen 
et al., 1985), made better intuitive judgments about the 
coherence of word triads (Bolte et al., 2003), and per­
formed better and faster when making complex decisions 
such as buying a car or making a medical decision than indi­
viduals induced with a negative mood (Estrada, Isen, & 
Young, 1997; Isen & Means, 1983). Other studies ﬁnd that 
negative moods facilitate the use of rational over intuitive 
decision-making (Bolte et al., 2003; Keltner et al., 1993). 
A number of recent studies on discrete emotions rather 
than moods, however, have shown that some negative emo­
tions can facilitate the use of intuitive decision-making. For 
instance, several laboratory studies have compared and 
contrasted the role of anger and sadness on intuitive deci­
sion-making and have demonstrated that people induced 
to feel angry tend to engage in intuitive decision-making, 
whereas people induced to feel sad tend to engage in ra­
tional decision-making (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 
1994; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). Tiedens and Linton (2001) 
Intuitive decision-making Rational decision-making References 
Type of cognitive System 1: System 2: Dane and Pratt (2007), 






Epstein (1998), Kahneman 
(2003), Lieberman (2000) 
– Associationistic – Causal 
Type of knowledge Experiential knowledge Abstract and explicit Ericsson and Charness (1994) 
relied upon and expertise knowledge 
Involvement of affect Affect-laden and vivid Affect-neutral Dane and Pratt (2007), Janis 
in the process and Mann (1977), Sinclair and 
Ashkanasy (2005) 
suggest that emotions associated with certainty appraisals 
(the belief that there are clear causes for life events and 
that coping with success and failure is possible), such as an­
ger and happiness, are more likely to be associated with the 
use of intuitive decision-making, whereas emotions associ­
ated with uncertainty appraisals (the belief that life events 
are largely out of one's control and difﬁcult to cope with), 
such as sadness or fear, are more likely to be associated 
with the use of rational decision-making. 
One laboratory study (Katkin, Wiens, & Ohman, 2001), 
however, ﬁnds evidence to the contrary, showing that vis­
ceral fear cues can help participants predict electric shocks. 
Fear can thus intuitively alert people to danger and provide 
them with a ‘‘gut feeling’’ on which to base a decision. 
Thus, extant laboratory studies have produced equivocal re­
sults: while positive mood has generally been shown to facil­
itate intuitive decision-making, and negative mood has 
generally been shown to facilitate rational decision-making, 
it is not clear that the same pattern holds true for discrete 
positive and negative emotions. In particular, no ﬁeld study 
has examined whether anger and fear facilitate rational or 
intuitive decision-making. We therefore investigate this 
issue as our ﬁrst research question. 
How do anger and fear inﬂuence decision 
effectiveness? 
Our second question regards the inﬂuence of anger and fear 
on decision effectiveness. To our knowledge, the literature 
is silent on this question. While Dane and Pratt (2007) ﬁlled 
an important gap in the literature by proposing factors that 
may inﬂuence the effectiveness of intuitive decision-mak­
ing, discrete emotions were not among the factors they con­
sidered. Furthermore, to our knowledge, no empirical ﬁeld 
study has investigated the inﬂuence of anger or fear on the 
effectiveness of decision-making. We thus address this 
question in our study. 
The literature does provide tantalizing ideas about the 
relationship between discrete negative emotions and deci­
sion-making, but many questions remain. While laboratory 
studies have provided helpful insight into these dynamics, 
particularly in the context of rational decision making, they 
are less generalizable to settings where intuitive decision-
making is most likely to be prevalent and critical: time-
pressured, complex actual organizational settings involving 
signiﬁcant investment of personnel and resources. The 
‘‘state of the art’’ in emotions and decision-making re­
search is the suspicion that emotions are essential to the 
decision-making process in naturalistic settings, yet the spe­
ciﬁc ways speciﬁc emotions inﬂuence the process have not 
been examined. We suggest that the naturalistic setting of 
ﬁlm direction provides an arena where the effects of felt 
anger and fear on decision-making can be examined 
in situ. Our methodology is described next. 
Method 
Epistemological assumptions 
Our approach is that of ‘‘transcendental realists’’; we be­
lieve that social and psychological phenomena exist in an 
objective plane, but that they are always ﬁltered by the 
subjective experience that individuals, including research­
ers, have of them (Manicas & Secord, 1983). More speciﬁ­
cally, we categorize our epistemology as psychological 
phenomenology (Giorgi, 1994; Giorgi & Giorgi, 2003). We 
are concerned with decision-makers' subjective experience 
of their own decision-making and emotions, and how the 
two relate. However, given our ‘‘transcendental realist’’ 
assumption, we recognize that people make decisions as 
the result of a confrontation with real (objective) events. 
For this reason, we adopt a qualitative method inspired 
from Coget (2009) dialogical inquiry paired with a grounded 
theory approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This method com­
bines a dialogical methodology (Rowe et al., 1989) aimed at 
reconstructing the lived experience of participants making 
intuitive decisions in the ﬁeld through an intersubjective 
empathetic dialogue, with a monological approach: the 
video analysis of decision-makers making intuitive decisions 
in the ﬁeld (Jordan & Henderson, 1995). 
Our method was designed to triangulate (Jick, 1979) be­
tween (1) data from an initial interview, aimed at capturing 
key dimensions of a decision-maker's past experience; (2) 
video data of the decision-maker making decisions in the 
ﬁeld, which constitute the most ‘‘objective’’ record of 
the situation; and (3) data from a second follow-up inter­
view with the decision-maker, aimed at co-discovering, 
through a dialogical process, the subjective perception 
the decision-maker had of the situation. The investigators 
and the respondents co-constructed knowledge. This 
socially constructed knowledge, then, is more heavily 
biased towards the ‘‘native’’ point of view of decision-
makers (Geertz, 1975). 
Population and setting 
An important step for us was to identify a population and 
setting in which both rational and intuitive decision-making 
occur frequently and can be observed. Our review of the lit­
erature suggested that people are most likely to engage in 
intuitive decision-making when they have higher decision-
making authority, when there is time pressure, and in crisis, 
complex, or uncertain situations (Dane & Pratt, 2007; 
Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005). Several populations and set­
tings ﬁt these requirements: ﬁreﬁghters confronting ﬁres, 
soldiers in combat situation, police ofﬁcers in the ﬁeld, 
chefs in the kitchen, CEOs and high level ofﬁcials in crisis 
situations, etc. Fireﬁghters and soldiers have been the sub­
ject of several studies on intuitive decision-making (e.g., 
Kaempf, Klein, Thordsen, & Wolf, 1996; Klein, 1998). 
Another population that would ﬁt the boundary conditions 
likely to produce intuitive decision-making is ﬁlm directors 
making decisions on set. To the authors' knowledge, intui­
tion and depth of processing have not been studied with this 
population. A glossary of key terms commonly used in the 
ﬁlm industry can be found in Appendix A. 
First, when shooting a ﬁlm, a director becomes the key 
decision-maker, having to make several crucial decisions 
per minute. By contrast, in pre- and post-production, other 
key players (e.g., the producer) become involved in deci­
sion-making. Second, in the production phase, the director's 
activity is crisis prone, complex, and subject to strong time 
pressures. Third, directing a ﬁlm involves making many cre­
ative choices, which is associated with intuitive decision-
making (Agor, 1991; Lubart & Getz, 1997). Finally, emotions 
are often expressed more freely in the entertainment indus­
try than in other settings (Bart & Guber, 2002), which makes 
them more easily identiﬁable. Film directors in the produc­
tion phase thus qualify as an adequate and interesting pop­
ulation and setting for this study. Following is a 
demographic summary of our sample. 
Seven ﬁlm directors were recruited for this study. The 
ﬁlm school of a major West Coast University was a particu­
larly rich source of contacts, yielding both direct partici­
pants (directing students) and access to professionals from 
the entertainment industry in Los Angeles. Although seven 
participants would be a small sample size for a quantitative 
hypothesis-testing study, it is appropriate for a qualitative 
study in psychological phenomenology, where the goal is 
to capture the rich subjective experience of the partici­
pants (Giorgi, 1994; Giorgi & Giorgi, 2003). 
Among the participants, three were professional ﬁlm 
directors and four were ﬁlm students at a major West Coast 
University shooting their Master of Fine Arts' thesis: a short 
ﬁlm. Four were men and three were women. Their ethnic 
backgrounds were varied: one was African-American, one 
was Asian-American, one was Persian-American, and four 
were Caucasian Americans. Their ages ranged from 28 to 
54 years, with an average of 39.6 years. They had directed 
from 2 to 7 ﬁlms previously, with a median of 3, and an 
average of 3.5. Although this number might seem low, it is 
actually typical of this industry where only the most prom­
inent directors, among the lucky ‘‘100 in Hollywood,’’ get 
to shoot ﬁlms regularly (Smith, 1998). The study was re­
viewed and authorized by a university committee for the 
protection of human subjects. The crews working on the 
ﬁlms ranged from 15 to 40 people, with an average crew size 
of 25 people, which is typical of independent ﬁlm crews. 
Four of the ﬁlms were short ﬁlms, and three were fea­
ture-length ﬁlms. Five of the ﬁlms had very small budgets 
ranging from $20,000 to $35,000. The remaining two ﬁlms 
had budgets of $300,000 and $1000,000, respectively. 
Data gathering protocol 
The ﬁrst author gathered the data and he and the second 
author analyzed it. Prior to the shoot, the ﬁrst author had 
an initial semi-structured interview with each director. 
The aim of the interview was to gain insight into the direc­
tor's upbringing, previous directing and leadership experi­
ences, management philosophy, and events that critically 
shaped his or her worldview. This interview allowed the ﬁrst 
author to identify key experiences that might inﬂuence how 
the director intuitively made sense of events that naturally 
unfolded on set, and what types of situations might elicit 
strong emotions. On average, initial interviews lasted 1.5 h. 
During the shoot, the ﬁrst author asked the participant 
directors to wear a wireless microphone and videotaped 
them while they were interacting with their crew and cast. 
Since ﬁlm directors move constantly on set, it was impossi­
ble to ﬁlm them from a ﬁxed location and they had to be 
shadowed. Participants can become self-conscious when 
being ﬁlmed, which can distort their behavior. Four ele­
ments limited this potential distortion. First, ﬁlm sets are 
very public and crowded, which helped make the ﬁrst 
author fade into the crowd. Second, crew members and 
directors are accustomed to cameras—a central tool of the 
trade—and to documentaries about the ‘‘making-of’’ the ﬁlm 
being made. This made them less sensitive to the presence 
of the camera. Third, the action on ﬁlm sets is so intense 
and the number of factors a director needs to attend is so 
high that the distraction of the camera appeared to recede 
quickly. Fourth, during intense situations in which the direc­
tor might have become more self-conscious, the ﬁrst author 
stepped away from the director while zooming from a dis­
tance to minimize interference. After the shoot, all of the 
participating directors indicated that they were only aware 
of the video camera in the ﬁrst few minutes of the shoot and 
rapidly forgot about it. 
The video record captured the whole situation the direc­
tor perceived along with the director's reaction to the situ­
ation, which allowed for subsequent behavioral coding of 
emotions. Each director was shadowed for a full day of 
shooting, which yielded an average of nine hours of footage 
per director. Archival data was also gathered before and 
after the shoot: the call-sheet, the script, and the shot-list 
(see Appendix). These documents helped to identify the dif­
ferent crew and cast observed and their role, and to under­
stand when the situation was deviating from the plan. 
After the shoot, the ﬁrst author analyzed the videotapes 
and selected critical incidents to be shown to the directors 
for commentary. Nine hours of footage per director can yield 
incidents in the hundreds. For practicality, an average of ﬁve 
to six critical incidents of one to ﬁve minutes per director 
were chosen, yielding a total of 41 critical episodes for the 
whole sample. The criterion to choose an incident was that 
it represented a crucial decision-making opportunity for the 
director. In order to recognize such instances, the ﬁrst author 
acquired some knowledge about the craft of ﬁlm directing be­
fore beginning the project. He attended a weeklong UCLA 
extension directing class taught by an experienced ﬁlm direc­
tor, and read various specialized books on ﬁlm direction and 
production. He watched documentaries on ﬁlm making, at­
tended commented screenings, and socialized with various 
ﬁlm industry specialists for over three years. 
After all the data had been gathered, the second author 
watched the selected incidents on his own. In 7% of the 
cases, he disagreed with the ﬁrst author that the incidents 
were critical decision-making situations, which led to their 
exclusion from the sample, reducing the ﬁnal useable sam­
ple to 38 critical incidents. The intercoder agreement for 
the degree of criticality of each decision-making incident 
is therefore 93%1 (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
1 We report only inter-rater agreements for the coding of our data 
rather than the more conservative Cohen's kappa. We note that for 
the inter-rater agreement percentage we report in the Data 
Gathering protocol above, we did not code the whole 9 h of video 
per respondent in terms of incidents, and therefore do not have a 
total number of incidents, as required by Cohen's kappa. Further­
more, some researchers (e.g., Strijbos, Martens, Prins, & Jochems, 
2006) have expressed concern over the Cohen's kappa tendency to 
take the observed categories' frequencies as givens, which can have 
the effect of underestimating agreement for a category that is also 
commonly used. For this reason, Cohen's kappa can be considered 
an overly conservative measure of agreement. 
Approximately one month after selecting the critical 
incidents, the ﬁrst author conducted a follow-up interview 
with the directors. This time delay allowed the directors 
to ﬁnish the ﬁlm production phase, during which they were 
unable to focus on other activities such as this research 
study, and gave the ﬁrst author time to select the critical 
events to be analyzed. This delay is consistent with other 
studies in phenomenological psychology (Harper, Lima, & 
Craufurd, 2000; Smith & Osborn, 2003). 
The ﬁrst author began each follow-up interview by asking 
the directors to recall the day they were videotaped and 
comment on signiﬁcant incidents that stood out in their 
memory. The directors usually recalled one to three critical 
incidents, and in each case these incidents had already been 
included in the sample. The directors also conﬁrmed that 
the additional incidents selected were indeed important 
decision-making instances. After this preliminary discus­
sion, videotaped segments of the critical incidents and of 
events related to them were shown to the directors. The 
investigator let the directors describe the situation in their 
own words, taking care not to lead the conversation. Then, 
often paraphrasing the directors, or summarizing their 
statements, he further questioned them about what they 
were experiencing in the moment, trying to create a safe 
and empathic atmosphere conducive to the emergence of 
a perspective-expanding dialogue (Kohut, 1959). This empa­
thetic dialogue allowed the directors to remember further 
details of their subjective experience and to resist artiﬁ­
cially justifying their behavior after the fact (Weick, Sutc­
liffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). On average, each follow-up 
interview lasted 2.5 h and was audio-taped. All the taped 
interviews and the videotaped episodes selected for discus­
sion in the follow-up interviews were transcribed profes­
sionally and checked for content and accuracy by the 
investigators. 
Data analysis 
In a ﬁrst round of data analysis, the ﬁrst two authors 
watched all the video excerpts several times together in 
combination with the ﬁlm directors' commentary to deter­
mine the coding scheme to be used to categorize the 38 crit­
ical incidents chosen. The authors chose to watch the videos 
together in order to further expand the perspective that 
was co-elaborated between the ﬁrst author and the direc­
tors during the follow-up interview, in an effort to reach 
trustworthiness by ‘‘correcting’’ the limitations and misun­
derstandings of individual interpretations of reality 
(Habermas, 1990; Sandberg, 2005). As important categories 
emerged, the authors consulted the relevant literature on 
emotion to elaborate and standardize their coding scheme. 
Both the video excerpts and the transcripts of the initial and 
the follow-up interviews were coded and linked together. 
For the transcripts, the unit of analysis chosen was a sen­
tence or a multisentence unit. For the video excerpts, the 
unit of analysis was not speciﬁed quantitatively. Instead, vi­
deo segments were coded with regards to the incident on 
tape and the commentary of the director (Jordan & Hender­
son, 1995). Verbal exchanges were coded, but also signiﬁ­
cant changes in body position, gaze, gestures, etc. The 
authors particularly looked for behavioral clues that con­
ﬁrmed or disconﬁrmed what the follow-up interview was 
revealing, in an attempt to achieve pragmatic and trans­
gressive validity (for more information on these terms, see 
Sandberg, 2005). 
In a second round, the ﬁrst two authors independently 
watched each video excerpt and its associated commentary 
again, and systematically applied the coding scheme. The 
ﬁve following categories were retained: (1) discrete emo­
tions felt by the ﬁlm director; (2) the intensity of these dis­
crete emotions for the director; (3) the type of experience 
or expertise, if any, mobilized by the director; (4) the type 
of decision-making (intuitive or rational decision-making) 
used; and (5) the effectiveness of the decision made. We 
now brieﬂy expand on each of these categories. 
The discrete emotions felt by the ﬁlm director during 
each incident were coded in two ways: by direct observation 
of the video and by analyzing the subjective account cap­
tured in the follow-up interview. First, the ﬁlm directors' fa­
cial expressions, gestures, vocal tone, and verbal cues were 
analyzed (Ekman, 1994; Scherer, 1986) to identify whether 
they expressed the emotions of anger or fear. Second, the 
directors' subjective accounts in the follow-up interview 
were analyzed to ascertain that they subjectively experi­
enced these emotions during the incident. Each instance 
of anger or fear was coded for its intensity (moderate, or 
high). Incidents in which anger and/or fear were not expe­
rienced were rejected, which reduced the sample of critical 
incidents to 28. 
The type of experience or expertise that the ﬁlm direc­
tors mobilized, if at all, was determined in reference to 
the initial interview and the follow-up interview. When 
the respondent mentioned in the initial interview or in the 
follow up interview that they had expertise about the type 
of situation or issue faced, this instance of decision-making 
was coded as rooted in expertise. When they remembered 
an isolated non-task relevant experience that shaped their 
decision-making, this instance of decision-making was 
coded as rooted in personal experience. 
For each critical incident, the decision-making process 
was coded as rational or intuitive decision-making. Based 
on the follow-up interview, the decision-making process 
was coded as rational decision-making when the ﬁlm direc­
tor remembered generating multiple possible courses of ac­
tions in the moment, evaluating them, and choosing one of 
them based on logical reasoning. The decision-making pro­
cess was coded as intuitive decision-making when the direc­
tor remembered reaching a decision fast, without analyzing 
the situation formally nor considering multiple alternatives. 
The effectiveness of ﬁlm-directors' decision-making is 
difﬁcult to assess for at least two reasons. First, the work 
of ﬁlm directors is artistic and therefore highly subjective. 
Second, it is difﬁcult to evaluate how actions taken at the 
micro level of analysis chosen (one day of shoot) affected 
the whole ﬁlm project at a macro level. Therefore, the 
directors' own after-the-fact subjective judgment was used 
as the criterion to assess the effectiveness of their decision-
making. 
The intercoder agreement reached on the application of 
the codes was of 89% (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Both 
authors re-analyzed the cases in which they had disagreed 
and successfully resolved the disagreements. The authors 
then continued to analyze the incidents to form overarching 
codes, to subdivide codes, and to discover relationships 
among codes. As they did so, they started to elaborate 
the model of anger, fear and decision-making that will be 
presented in the ﬁndings section. The authors expanded 
and reﬁned the model by comparing and contrasting the dif­
ferent incidents until the model stopped evolving and theo­
retical saturation was reached (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
Findings 
This study aimed to answer two questions: Do anger and fear 
respectively facilitate the use of rational or intuitive deci­
sion-making? And how do they inﬂuence decision-making 
effectiveness? First, we provide a preview of our ﬁndings, 
which we illustrate in Table 2. Second, we elaborate our 
ﬁndings in depth and illustrate them with multiple quotes. 
In attempting to answer our ﬁrst question, we inductively 
developed a new typology of decision-making. More specif­
ically, we found that ﬁlm directors engage in two types of 
intuitive decision-making: expert-intuitive decision-making 
and emotional-intuitive decision-making. Expert-intuitive 
decision-making occurs when directors, driven by feelings 
Table 2 Anger and fear in IDM and RDM. 
of moderate anger, draw upon their professional expertise 
about a given situation. Emotional-intuitive decision-making 
occurs when directors, driven by feelings of high intensity 
fear or anger and no previous expertise with a situation, 
conjure up personal emotional experiences. A third type 
of decision-making, rational decision-making, occurs when 
directors, driven by feelings of moderate fear and little pre­
vious experience with a situation, rely on a more conscious, 
deliberative decision-making process. 
In attempting to answer our second question, we induc­
tively developed a typology of decision-making effective­
ness. Directors do not judge their decision-making as 
simply effective or ineffective. Rather, they emphasize four 
types of effectiveness based on the decision-making they 
are engaged in: (1) task effectiveness, (2) personal effec­
tiveness, (3) personal growth, and (4) leadership effective­
ness. Task effectiveness indicates a focus on the resolution 
of external problems and the achievement of professional 
goals. Personal effectiveness refers to directors' internal 
functioning: the extent to which they remain calm, bal­
anced, and motivated so that they can keep functioning at 
their highest ability throughout the busy day of a shoot. 
Type of decision making Expert IDM Emotional IDM RDM 
Deﬁnition Directors, driven by Directors, driven by feelings Directors, driven by 
feelings of moderate of high intensity fear or feelings of moderate fear 
anger, draw upon anger and no previous and little previous 
their professional expertise with a situation, experience with a 
expertise about a conjure up personal emotional situation, rely on a 
given situation to experiences to make an intuitive conscious, deliberative 
make an intuitive decision decision-making process 
decision 
Nb of cases 5 14 9 
Antecedents 
Previous experience Expertise Personal Lack of previous 
emotional experience with the 
experience or Lack situation 
of previous 
experience 
Emotion Moderate anger High anger or High fear Moderate fear 
Decision making effectiveness 
Task effectiveness Main focus Pursued Decreased Achieved 
The resolution of external aggressively 
problems and the achievement of 
professional goals 
Personal effectiveness Achieved Achieved Achieved by Slightly diminished 
Extent to which directors remain automatically through automatically avoiding threats because it demands more 
calm, balanced, and motivated so feelings of mastery through feelings of cognitive resources 
that they can keep functioning at mastery 
their highest ability 
Leadership effectiveness Decreased 
Directors' ability to build or 
strengthen their relationships 
with their crew and cast 
Personal growth Occasionally achieved 
Directors learn something new or 
build their expertise 
Personal growth occurs when directors learn something new 
or build their expertise. Finally, leadership effectiveness re­
fers to directors' ability to build or strengthen their relation­
ships with their crew and cast. 
When engaged in expert-intuitive decision-making, mo­
vie directors emphasize task effectiveness. However, they 
also achieve personal effectiveness automatically as their 
expertise provides them with a sense of conﬁdence. The 
effectiveness of emotional-intuitive decision-making de­
pends on whether it is triggered by high fear or high anger. 
In the case of high fear, directors emphasize personal effec­
tiveness at the expense of task effectiveness: they abandon 
their professional goals and their focus on external prob­
lems to focus on resolving their inner distress. In the case 
of high anger, directors emphasize task effectiveness, 
aggressively pursuing their professional goals and automati­
cally achieving personal effectiveness by doing so. How­
ever, this type of effectiveness is achieved at the expense 
of leadership effectiveness: relationships are often weak­
ened or damaged in the process. Finally, when engaged in 
rational decision-making, movie directors emphasize task 
effectiveness at the expense of personal effectiveness: they 
brave their fear in order to tackle external problems. In 
doing so, they achieve personal growth as they discover 
solutions to new problems and build their expertise. Table 
2 summarizes these ﬁndings. 
In summary, the type of decision-making that directors 
engage in and their effectiveness depend on the type of 
emotion they feel (anger or fear); their intensity (moderate 
or high); and the type of previous experience they have with 
the situation they face (expertise, personal experience, or 
lack of previous experience). Next, we elaborate the evi­
dence supporting these ﬁndings by analyzing in depth the 
three types of decision-making we found directors using on 
set: expert-intuitive decision-making, emotional-intuitive 
decision-making, and rational decision-making. In each case, 
we discuss their antecedents and their effectiveness. 
Expert-intuitive decision-making 
Respondents describe both expert and emotional intuitive 
decision-making as a non-rational, instinctive process that 
is difﬁcult to explain. One director captured this typical re­
sponse as, 
How do I do it? Man, you know, it's like intellectualizing 
to verbalize something that's so instinctive. 
However, one of the key features that differentiates ex­
pert-intuitive decision-making from emotional-intuitive 
decision-making is the presence of expertise (see Kahneman 
& Klein, 2009; Salas et al., 2010). Elaborating on how he was 
able to make an intuitive decision, the same director noted: 
It's about experience and repetition and wisdom, you 
know. . .  many, many classes, many, many years, many 
plays, many experiences, many studies, watching a thou­
sand movies, travelling all over. 
Indeed, research on experts has clearly established the 
link between repeated exposure to speciﬁc types of prob­
lems through practice and training and the ability to make 
decisions accurately and fast (Ericsson & Charness, 1994; 
Simon, 1987). Through expertise, movie directors are able 
to recognize and match patterns in a present situation with 
similar patterns in previous situations. This allows them to 
make an intuitive decision that resolves an external problem 
and achieves task effectiveness. One director, for instance, 
decided to switch from ‘‘ﬂame-bars’’ to ‘‘orange lights’’ to 
simulate the visual effect of an explosion on his actors' 
faces based on his expert understanding of safety: 
When a special effects guy tells you that he has a safety 
concern and you ignore that, as a director, you're respon­
sible. It all goes back to the TTwilight Zone' disaster 
where the actor. . .  and the two kids were killed. . .  Heli­
copters were supposed to come down toward [the actors] 
and they were supposed to run away. . .. and these explo­
sions were supposed to go off. And every take, the direc­
tor told the helicopter guy to come in lower and. . . telling 
the pyro guys to make the explosions bigger. And so at 
one point, the helicopter came in directly over a big pyro 
charge. . .  and it crashed into the water and it cut off the 
head of the lead actor. . .  and killed both of the Vietnam­
ese children. . .  and it was the fault of the director. 
In all of our cases of expert-intuitive decision-making 
directors gave indication that they had expertise, either in 
the follow-up interview or in the initial interview. They indi­
cated that they experienced a moderate form of anger. In 
the example described above, for instance, the director 
commented: 
I was annoyed the ﬁrst time it happened days before this 
[referring to safety concerns that led to diminished spe­
cial effects]. . . I think if I had been really expecting it and 
depending on it, I would have freaked out. But I just 
knew these guys' [referring to the special effects crew] 
modus operandi: they're about the most minimal, safest 
way to do anything. 
As evidenced in the quote, expertise helps directors reg­
ulate their anger by providing them with a sense of control 
over the situation. Conversely, anger mobilizes memories 
that elicit expertise. For instance, one director commented 
on her intuitive decision to ask her set designer to store cru­
cial props in a safe place: 
As much as I was in love with the actors and the charac­
ters. . .  I was in love with the ideas of these props. . .  I 
just– yeah, I just want to protect them and make sure 
that. . .  no Joe-Schmo comes along and just like drops a 
fu*king light on it and that's it, you know? 
The moderate anger that she felt motivated her to pro­
tect the props based on memories she had of a previous 
shoot during which a crucial prop was dropped and broken: 
I think if something ﬂashed into my brain it might've been 
the Death Valley shoot where. . . one of my crew dropped 
something on the space helmet and it broke. We had to 
go home. . .  and wrap. I just remember like, getting to 
the motel and crying. . . And it was the ﬁrst time I've ever 
cried on a set. 
Anger and expertise thus recursively inﬂuence each 
other. When engaging in expert-intuitive decision-making, 
movie directors focus on task effectiveness and goal 
achievement. For instance, one of the directors commented 
the following about her decision to keep a child actor work­
ing beyond prescribed hours in order to get the scenes she 
needed: 
I didn't want to have this conversation with the Mom but I 
had to. . . We were under the bullet and the kid was tired, 
and I knew he was tired, but I needed a few more things 
with him before we stopped. . . So, I looked at the teacher 
for like some kind of approval but the teacher just rolled 
her head and was like boring her eyes into the head of 
the Mom, you know, hoping that she would turn around, 
but the Mom didn't turn around. . .  And I looked at the 
teacher and I realized that she wasn't going to do any­
thing, so I turned around and I was like ‘‘I won,’’ [laughs] 
and I was like ‘‘What a b*tch!’’ And then I started laugh­
ing Tcause I thought about her face and like how intense 
and funny it was. 
When achieving their goals, directors automatically 
achieve personal effectiveness because they feel conﬁdent. 
Next, we elaborate on emotional-intuitive decision-making. 
Emotional-intuitive decision-making 
Emotional-intuitive decision-making is similar to expert-
intuitive decision-making in that they both are non-rational, 
instinctive processes that do not involve the generation of 
multiple alternatives and their analysis. However, in emo­
tional-intuitive decision-making, the decision-making pro­
cess is driven by strong emotions rather than by expertise. 
One director commented on the way high anger drives her 
decision-making: 
I use [anger] as an excuse to say what I've been wanting 
to say and it comes out in such a volcanic way that no one 
can argue with that. Just, boom, I'm over the edge and 
everything comes out. 
In emotional-intuitive decision-making the strong emo­
tions directors feel are often related to vivid personal expe­
riences they had that inform their understanding of the 
situation. One director, for instance, decided to ﬁght rather 
than accommodate the way her elderly Chinese actress 
acted her part based on feelings of anger she had for her 
own Vietnamese, ethnic Chinese grandmother, who her ac­
tress reminded her of: 
She [the actress] was like my maternal grandmother, 
who moved to the United States from Vietnam. . .  I didn't 
speak her language. She didn't speak mine, and so we 
were never really able to communicate. . .  She'd see me 
and she'd just say ‘‘You wear too much black!’’, you 
know, ‘‘Why don't you know how to speak Chinese?’’ 
and she was very critical. 
In another example, the director decided to adopt a 
‘‘strong-armed’’ strategy to retain an actress who had 
threatened to quit: 
I wanted to get her alone to make it absolutely clear. . .  
that I have absolutely no fear or need of her threat so 
she knows that she can do that all night and it's going 
to be completely ineffective, okay? We learn that in 
the streets: when a guy points a gun at you, nine out of 
ten times, he's not going to pull the trigger. He's going 
to scare you. So. . .  the ﬁrst thing you say to him is Tyou'd 
better shoot me because I'll kill you when you take it off. 
Now that you've pulled it, you'd better kill me because 
you're dead. You threatened my life.' At that point, 
you're gonna know his commitment, because if he's going 
to kill you, you're dead anyway. 
This director's strategy was rooted in his personal expe­
rienced during his adolescence as a gang member in Los 
Angeles, which he recounted in the initial interview. 
In a second set of cases the directors lacked any form of 
experience with a situation, whether personal or rooted in 
expertise. In these cases, their decisions were driven by 
the emotion itself. In one such example, the shoot was 
interrupted when a train stopped next to the set, which 
was located by railroad tracks. The sound of the train's en­
gine ruined the shot. The train conductors were looking with 
apparent curiosity at the set. Although the director had 
never faced such a situation before, she reacted quickly 
by giving in to her strong anger: 
I felt frustrated. It's like ‘‘Oh, God! Enough!’’ [a helicopter 
had caused a similar sound issue earlier in the day] I was 
standing there going like this [gesturing wildly] ‘‘Go!’’ 
I'll tell you, it's exhausting. I must have been exhausted 
then, man. I'm exhausted just looking at it, you know? 
The focus of the decision-making effectiveness differed 
in the cases of emotional-intuitive decision-making associ­
ated with high anger versus high fear. In the case of high an­
ger, directors give priority to task effectiveness, also 
automatically achieving personal effectiveness because 
they achieved their goals, but possibly damaging their lead­
ership effectiveness. In one case, for instance, the director 
decided to ﬁre her main actress before she had shot any 
scene because she proved to be too difﬁcult to direct: 
I can feel myself getting angry just hearing that and 
that. . .  She really got me angry. . .  I'm really p*ssed. . .  I 
thought, TShe's just gonna keep doing this!' And I was get­
ting more and more solidiﬁed: this ain't gonna f*cking 
continue. . .  I didn't say, TYou're ﬁred', I said, TIt's over. 
That's it.' I'm easygoing but when I feel control is being 
taken, then I don't like it, you know? And I ﬁght against it. 
While the director felt effective addressing the immedi­
ate problem by replacing the difﬁcult actress with an easier 
one that was standing by for the role, she expressed ambiv­
alence at the potentially negative leadership effect of her 
outburst on her crew and cast: 
What was I doing, marching out of there [the make-up 
trailer] saying ‘‘it's over’’? They [the crew and cast] 
didn't need to know it in that way. . . I think I should have 
probably just kept my mouth shut and just go on– but 
that was sort of letting out my emotion, I think. I was 
so angry with– I was just really p*ssed. Yeah, I was get­
ting it out. I wish I'd contained it. . .  I think it would have 
been a little more digniﬁed, you know? I shouldn't have 
done that in front of my crew. I mean, they all knew or 
they would have found out. 
In the case of emotional-intuitive decision-making 
associated with high fear, directors give priority to their 
personal effectiveness at the expense of their task 
effectiveness. In one case an actress was to display intense 
emotions as her husband, whom she had believed to have 
been hurt in a car accident, showed up at home, unharmed. 
The actress looked very tense as she was preparing for the 
scene. The director decided to let her play as she had 
intended, despite the fact that he did not like her perfor­
mance because he experienced intense fear: 
It's an emotional scene. This is her close up and she is 
wound so tight and I'm starting to recognize this right 
now. . .  She wanted her space, she was very concen­
trated, very focused, [which is] a bad thing. . .  because 
actors can't act when they're wound tight.. . . [It felt] like 
hearing a rattlesnake's rattle. . .  She's locked and loaded, 
whatever she is going to do, she is going to do. . .  Once I 
saw that tension, I adjusted to it. 
The director commented that his reaction resulted in a 
less-than-optimal outcome; he had responded to his own 
fear and need to personally cope with the fear, rather than 
focusing on task effectiveness: shooting the scene in a way 
to provide further options: 
I knew that I was shooting stuff that I probably wouldn't 
be able to use, that it was a little too peaked themati­
cally for what was going on in my scene. . .  I think if I'd 
had more experience I would've pulled it back. . .  In my 
mind, I saw my cut as being. . .  the daughter's scene. . .  
By shooting it with different angles, at that moment I 
would probably be watching the daughter in terms of 
the audience. So that's what was primarily going through 
my head. . . At the same time it scares me because. . . I try 
to shoot it so all the content is good to give extra solu­
tions, more options in editing because you never know 
what it's gonna look like, until after the editing process. 
I could have stepped in and pulled it back. . .  and I prob­
ably should have. . .  I was thinking about my solution as 
opposed to going and getting all the scenes the way I 
visualized them. 
Next, we elaborate on rational decision-making motivated 
by moderate fear. 
Rational decision-making 
Besides expert-intuitive decision-making and emotional-
intuitive decision-making, we also observed directors 
engaging in rational decision-making. When engaging in ra­
tional decision-making, directors considered, analyzed, 
and evaluated multiple alternatives. In all of the cases in 
which they used rational decision-making, directors had nei­
ther expertise nor personal experiences that allowed them 
to easily make sense of the situation, which explains why 
they had to take the time to analyze it rationally. They also 
experienced a moderate level of fear, which motivated 
them to address an external problem through rational deci­
sion-making. For instance, in one case, the director had to 
ﬁgure out the exact choreography of a group of motorcycles 
driven by stunt artists throughout multiple shots. The scene 
represented a motorcycle gang encircling the two protago­
nists and performing jumps and various imposing stunts. 
The director commented on the episode: 
I remember now being a bit scared. It's like, ‘‘Jesus 
Christ. I thought we had this done. I mean, this is so 
huge.’’ It seemed like such a huge task. It was really cho­
reography of where those bikes were going. And I was 
like, ‘‘Oh, my God. How are we gonna do this?’’ I thought 
I had done that with [my director of photography] 
already, that we had gone through this. But it's like, 
okay, now we've got to do it again. . .  So, I called [my 
script supervisor] in to. . .  write this down. . .  I was taking 
steps. . .  and I needed that written down because I wasn't 
gonna remember it all. 
When engaging in rational decision-making, directors fo­
cus on task effectiveness at the expense of their personal 
effectiveness or comfort. The previous director commented 
the following on the effectiveness of her rational decision-
making: 
[The script supervisor] was really organized and really 
good. . .  She was extremely helpful. It worked. 
Also, when engaging in rational decision-making, some 
directors achieved personal growth because they learned 
something new, thus building expertise. One director made 
the following comment on his decision to abandon elaborate 
shooting plans and move faster because of difﬁcult weather 
conditions: 
It was f*cking cold. And at one point, the wind was so 
intense that the Musco light operator was starting to 
bring his light down. . .  because he was scared to have 
his light up in the air. And so I had to start moving faster 
and faster and faster. . .  And you have a pressure in the 
afternoon to get it ﬁnished before it gets dark. . .  So the 
pressures of having cold actors, cold crew members, 
me being cold, a light operator who was pulling my light 
down and making all the lighting look weird added up. . .  
Everybody wanted to get the f*ck done with it. . . So, peo­
ple eventually started moving faster and with urgency. . .  
So, I had a discussion with my line-producer about aban­
doning my plan of coverage and doing something simplis­
tic that just got this in the can. So we accomplished it. I 
mean we- it's kind of like, we didn't know what we were 
doing. . .  but it's nice, clean coverage, and each angle is 
there that I needed, and it's a ﬁne scene. It's pedestrian. 
And in its coverage that's very uninventive, but I was 
uninventive for practicality' sake. . .  It was a good prob­
lem-solving approach. . .  Well I'm proud. No one will ever 




This study's goal was to examine the effect of two speciﬁc 
emotions, anger and fear, on decision-making. While previ­
ous research has proposed that emotions inﬂuence depth of 
processing (e.g. Isen et al., 1985), the dynamics of this rela­
tionship have not been fully examined, particularly in the 
context of direct emotional experiences in real—as opposed 
to laboratory—decision environments. Moreover, the focus of 
previous studies has been on relatively simple dichotomies: 
between negative/positive valences and depth of process­
ing. These studies primarily ﬁnd that negative emotional 
states tend to lead to more systematic cognitive processing 
characteristic of rational decision-making, while positive 
emotional states lead to intuitive decision-making (e.g., 
Bolte et al., 2003; Isen, 2000). Later studies using discrete 
emotions reveal that certainty emotions (such as anger) 
are more likely to lead to intuitive processing than uncer­
tainty emotions (such as fear; Tiedens & Linton, 2001). 
Our ﬁndings add nuance, complexity, and speciﬁcity to 
these relationships. The typology we inductively developed 
suggests that not only should speciﬁc emotions, such as an­
ger and fear, be delineated, but their intensity (moderate 
versus high) must also be considered. These emotional 
states recursively inﬂuence and are inﬂuenced by the deci­
sion maker's level of expertise and personal experience—or 
their perceived lack of experience—when confronting a par­
ticular situation. This combination of felt emotion and 
perceived experience affects the type of decision-making 
used, and the degree to which a decision outcome is re­
garded as effective, based on task, personal, or leadership 
effectiveness. 
Do anger and fear facilitate the use of intuitive decision-
making or rational decision-making? 
This question helped us to address and elaborate on previ­
ous understandings of the process of emotion and deci­
sion-making. First, this study contributes to the literature 
on emotion and intuition by investigating a rarely-studied 
emotion, fear, in relation to intuitive decision-making. Pre­
vious studies have found that speciﬁc emotions associated 
with an appraisal of uncertainty, such as sadness, are asso­
ciated with a tendency toward greater use of rational deci­
sion-making (e.g. Tiedens & Linton, 2001). While we 
expected that fear would ﬁt this previously identiﬁed pat­
tern, our ﬁndings revealed a more speciﬁc relationship: 
the model proposes that moderate intensity fear facilitates 
rational decision-making, while high intensity fear facili­
tates a form of intuitive decision-making that leads the 
decision maker to abandon important professional goals. 
Second, our ﬁndings suggest that the research question 
above, focusing as it does only on the presence of a partic­
ular emotion and a dichotomy between intuitive decision-
making and rational decision-making, is too simple. Rather, 
a key determinant of the type of decision-making used in 
this study was the intensity of the anger and fear felt (see 
Frijda, 1986; Hodgkinson, Langan-Fox, & Sadler-Smith, 
2008). All of the decisions we examined were by deﬁnition 
emotional; what varied was their intensity, and this inten­
sity, coupled with respondents' perception of whether they 
had the expertise or experience to cope with their emotion, 
determined the type of decision-making they used. 
Third, we ﬁnd an important distinction between expert 
and emotional intuitive decision-making. Expert-intuitive 
decision-making has been the primary focus of previous 
studies: intuitive decision-making has primarily been char­
acterized as driven by experience made up of explicit and 
tacit knowledge and emotions are a contributor—sometimes 
for the better, sometimes for the worse—to this process (see 
Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Khatri & Ng, 2000; Klein, 1998; 
Salas et al., 2010; Sayegh et al., 2004). In our study, situa­
tions evoking moderate anger were most likely to lead to ex­
pert-intuitive decision-making, a relationship unexamined 
in previous research. We then develop a new concept, emo­
tional-intuitive decision-making, suggesting that, in addi­
tion to past experience, intuitive decision-making may 
also be driven by emotions. In these situations, high anger 
or high fear appears to make salient emotional memories 
consistent with personal experience (see Sayegh et al., 
2004), or a perception that an adequate experience base 
does not exist for making a rational decision. It is interesting 
to note that when high anger or high fear drives intuitive 
decision-making, the beneﬁts of intuition (rapid decision-
making under stressful conditions) are accompanied by a 
cost: in the case of high anger, task effectiveness comes 
at the expense of leadership effectiveness, and the group 
or organization may suffer; in the case of high fear, personal 
effectiveness is accomplished at the expense of task effec­
tiveness. In this case, the effort to cope with high fear and 
attend to one's individual needs may distract decision-mak­
ers from their task goals. 
Our newly proposed concept of emotional-intuitive 
decision-making furthers the debate about the distinction 
between emotion and intuitive decision-making. 
Sadler-Smith (2008), Sadler-Smith (2010) proposes that intu­
itions are less intense, longer in duration, and have a less clear 
cause than emotions. While his conceptualization is useful in 
distinguishing expert-intuitive decision-making from 
emotion, it is less useful to distinguish emotional-intuitive 
decision-making from emotion itself. Following Damasio 
(1998) conceptualization of emotion and feeling, we suggest 
that intuitions are a particular type of feeling, which are 
cognitive elaborations of emotion – a somatic process. 
Emotions therefore serve as inputs to the process of intuitive 
decision-making; they are not the same as intuitions. 
What is the impact of anger and fear on decision 
effectiveness? 
Our model indicates that, in determining the impact of 
emotions on decision-making effectiveness, we must add 
more speciﬁcity to the antecedent emotions, in the sense 
of considering intensity. Our ﬁndings also suggest that we 
must add more speciﬁcity to our outcome variable, by delin­
eating what kind of effectiveness. It is not enough to deter­
mine whether a decision was dichotomously effective or 
not, but rather, effective in terms of what aspects of the 
decision and situation. For example, we ﬁnd that both high 
anger and high fear led to intuitive decision-making in our 
respondents. The difference was in the outcome—how these 
emotions inﬂuenced task, personal, and leadership effec­
tiveness. In this sense, high levels of anger felt by directors 
have the potential to lead to more effective task outcomes 
than high levels of fear, a relationship that should be exam­
ined in further ﬁeld research. 
Our model contributes to further understanding of intui­
tive decision-making effectiveness. In the case of anger, our 
model provides empirical support for Dane and Pratt (2007) 
theoretical prediction that intuitive decision-making is 
more effective when it relies on domain relevant expertise 
than on personal experiences: we found that when anger 
was associated with past professional situations, intuitive 
decision-making was more effective than when anger was 
associated with personal situations. However, in the case 
of fear, our ﬁndings provide a new picture: moderate fear 
leads to moderately effective rational decision-making, 
whereas high intensity fear leads to ineffective intuitive 
decision-making. These predictions cast a new light on our 
understanding of decision-making effectiveness. 
Further research 
We have emphasized that the decision-making of movie 
directors on set is characteristic of a range of settings where 
decision-making takes place under time-pressured, action-
oriented, highly ﬂuid situations. While we believe this type 
of decision-making is generalizable, it is important to note 
that while the directors studied did confront ‘‘crisis’’ deci­
sions, especially in terms of actors to use and artistic 
choices, these crises may not be comparable with the crisis 
situations of ﬁreﬁghters or military commanders that have 
been the focus of past intuitive decision-making research 
(e.g., Klein, 1998). Further studies could therefore examine 
other settings to extend the generalizeability of our ﬁnd­
ings. On a related note, the nature and culture of the enter­
tainment industry may make expression of emotions more 
acceptable than other organizational settings. Thus, our 
ﬁndings pertaining to high anger and fear may reﬂect this 
higher acceptance—and lower regulation—of emotional re­
sponse (see Geddes & Callister, 2007). This factor makes 
this an appropriate initial setting to explore more extreme 
examples of emotional feeling and expression; further study 
should examine settings where norms for appropriateness 
dictate more subdued expression. 
An area of this study that could be re-visited in future 
research is the way decision-making effectiveness was 
measured. We used the participants' after-the-fact self-
assessment of their decision-making as a measure of their 
effectiveness. The point of view of the participant could 
be biased. For instance, in the example in which a director 
decided to keep her child actor working beyond prescribed 
hours, it could be argued that the decision was operationally 
effective, but unethical. The ﬁndings may therefore reﬂect 
whether participants regretted their intuitive decision-mak­
ing rather than whether their intuitive decision-making was 
effective. Further studies should therefore seek to measure 
intuitive decision-making effectiveness in multiple ways, 
triangulating among them. 
It would also be interesting to explore in further studies 
the mechanisms through which different discrete emotions 
inﬂuence the process of intuitive decision-making. While 
this study provides us with a better understanding of how 
anger and fear inﬂuence depth of processing, we did not 
investigate how they may inﬂuence the process of intuitive 
decision-making itself. Lerner and Tiedens (2006) suggest a 
range of mechanisms for the effects of anger on decision 
processes and outcomes. It would be interesting to expand 
these suggestions in conjunction with our ﬁndings, and test 
them in further studies. 
Practical implications 
While this study's ﬁndings must be considered exploratory, 
there are several practical implications. This study suggests 
that decision makers should monitor their emotions as 
important signals of their response to the situations con­
fronting them and the likelihood that they will engage in 
effective decision-making. Feelings of moderate (and thus 
controllable) anger may alert decision makers that drawing 
on past expertise may be possible and that their intuitive 
‘‘gut feelings’’ may be helpful. Feelings of high anger 
should indicate that decisions directly resolving the task 
may occur, but leadership effectiveness could be compro­
mised. Indeed, stories abound in the entertainment industry 
of leaders who allow their anger ‘‘tantrums’’ to hinder per­
sonal relationships and their ability to effectively lead their 
organizations. Directors such as Oliver Stone and Alfred 
Hitchcock are notorious cases in point. Feelings of moderate 
fear or anxiety should signal to decision makers that time 
should be taken to consider choices carefully and perhaps 
seek outside advice. Feelings of high fear should provide 
cautions to decision makers that likely they are focusing 
on the personal history and implications of a particular sit­
uation rather than on aspects of the task itself. While we 
are aware that monitoring emotions while they are being 
felt is difﬁcult, understanding these relationships ahead of 
time could help a decision maker to better understand his 
or her emotional tendencies and their potential outcomes 
in the heat of crisis decision-making. 
Conclusion 
There has been great progress in unveiling the myth of ratio­
nality and decision-making since Simon (Simon, 1955; Simon 
& Holt, 1954) began this research program (see Cabantous & 
Gond, 2011; Laroche, 1995; March, 2006). This study pro­
vides an exploratory model of how anger and fear can help 
or impede decision-making in the ﬁeld. By seeking to get 
closer to the phenomenon of interest by observing leaders 
as they actively engage in actual decision-making and 
engaging participants in self-reﬂection, our model may 
more closely capture the reality of intuitive and rational 
decision-making than previous laboratory-based studies. 
This is especially appropriate in studying a phenomenon that 
resides outside the controlled conﬁnes of the laboratory in 
the real time, high stress, pressure cooker of actual groups 
and organizations. 
Appendix A. Glossary of key terms used in the 
ﬁlm industry 
A.1. Adjustment 
Adjusting an actor means to provide him or her with speciﬁc 
directions about how to change the way he or she is acting 
for the next take: tone of voice, facial expression, words, 
position, emotional expressiveness, etc. 
A.2. Assistant director (AD) 
The assistant director assists the director on a minute per 
minute basis. He or she relieves the director from all of 
the logistical aspects of the shoot, keeps things moving, 
brings actors on the set, stops trafﬁc when the shoot is 
about to begin, asks set-designers and costume-designers 
to bring the props needed to the scene, etc. 
A.3. Call-sheet 
A list of all the people who were present on set, their func­
tion and their contact. 
A.4. Director of photography (DP) 
The director of photography (DP) is in charge of the cinema­
tography of the ﬁlm, which includes lighting the set, and 
dynamically framing the shots. He or she manages the tech­
nical crew that operates the camera(s) and the lighting 
equipment. On the set, the DP makes decisions with the 
director about lighting, shots, angles, lenses, crane, etc. 
A.5. Film director 
The director of a ﬁlm orchestrates the whole artistic part of 
the process of ﬁlm-making. He or she translates the script 
on ﬁlm, choosing locations, sets, angles of ﬁlming, lighting, 
special effects, editing, and directing actors' performances. 
A.6. Producer 
The producer of a ﬁlm organizes the administrative aspects 
of the process of ﬁlm-making – ﬁnancing, marketing, distri­
bution, legal issues, and planning of the production phase in 
conjunction with the director – and controls that the pro­
duction stays on time and on budget. 
A.7. Production, pre-production, and post­
production 
The artistic production of a ﬁlm involves three phases. (1) In 
pre-production, the director and his or her key collaborators 
plan the shoot, selecting locations, casting and possibly 
rehearsing with actors, storyboarding the script, giving 
instructions for the building of sets and special effects de­
vices, obtaining permits, and preparing the shooting pro­
gram and the budget. (2) In the production phase, the ﬁlm 
is actually shot on locations and sets with the whole ﬁlm 
crew and cast. (3) In post-production, the ﬁlm is edited, 
some special effects applied, the sound is retouched, and 
the music is added. 
A.8. Script supervisor 
Script supervisors are in charge of ensuring that continuity is 
preserved between scenes (e.g. that actors wear the same 
costumes or that props are in the same position). 
A.9. Shot-list 
The list of scenes to be shot, their order, the time they are 
expected to take to shoot, the crew and cast involved, and 
other information. 
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